Under-trained Official put in Command

“Evil... creates a world of shadows - shadow play - shadow government.  It lives by the lie.” 

                                                    — VOX NYC

National Military Command Center Operations Director puts an under-trained subordinate on his watch the next morning — 9/11.

Navy Captain Charles J. Leidig, Jr. revealed that on September 10 he was asked by Brigadier General Montague Winfield to stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations in the Pentagon’s command center, the NMCC, on the following day, September 11.  Leidig stated, “I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 0830 on 11 September 2001 which would require supervision and operation of all necessary communications as watch commander.”¹²¹ Winfield had requested Leidig to assume his watch interestedly, in what turned out to be the very outset of the September 11 attacks — just after American Flight 11 was allegedly hijacked.     

Captain was pressed through training to be barely eligible for standing watch.

Captain Leidig explained to the 9/11 Commission:

…Further, I qualified in August 2001 to stand watch as the Deputy Director for Operations in the NMCC ...Shortly after assuming duty, I received the first report of a plane’s striking the World Trade Center ...In response to these events, I convened a Significant Event Conference, which was subsequently upgraded to an Air Threat Conference.¹²¹

Winfield handed over control of communications and supervision of the NMCC to Leidig during the attacks when he knew the Captain had just met the supervision qualifications to stand watch days earlier.  Also, his testimony leads one to suspect that Leidig was assuming the critical NMCC military communications watch position for the very first time — a fact completely lost upon the Commission, as they never thought to broach the subject for verification.

General Winfield reassumes command after attacks are over. 

Leidig said that Winfield relieved him and reassumed his duties as Deputy Director for Operations for the NMCC just before United Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania and the attacks were over, which would have been around 10:00 am, during what had become an Air Threat phone conference.[i]  All of which raises questions regarding…  Why did the experienced General Winfield leave his watch after the attacks had begun at 8:30 a.m.?  And why did General Winfield choose to reassert his position from Leidig again, just after 10:00 a.m.?  Interestingly, Leidig had a particularly short career in the NMCC.  Was he just trained for that one historical day?

In interviews with the media, General Winfield implies that he is in command at the NMCC.

From CNN Good Morning, Sept. 4, 2002:

We realized that the seemingly unrelated hijackings that the FAA was tracking were actually a part of a coordinated terrorist attack against the United States.[ii]

Notice Winfield now says he was there in the NMCC (at least when AA77 crashed) and in command (this contradicts the whole Leidig affair).  CNN implies he was there the whole time, and certainly he doesn’t correct that (ABC has roughly the same thing). Barbara Starr of CNN interjected:

Brigadier General Montague Winfield was in command of the military’s worldwide nerve center that morning, the center’s logbook a record of the opening moments of the war: 8:48, first plane hits the World Trade Center; 9:02, second explosion at the World Trade Center; at 9:38, American Airlines Flight 77 slams into the Pentagon.  The Command Center is on the other side of the massive building.  Winfield and his staff never feel the impact.  They see the flames on television as alarms go off inside.  Smoke soon reaches the Command Center.  Still, the Command Center remains icy calm.  Winfield is running a secure phone call with the White House, the FAA, and the North American Air Defense Command, NORAD.¹²²

Was Brigadier General Montague Winfield really at the NMCC that morning?  That’s what he’s telling the media.  The 9/11 Commission Report and its hearings are completely contrary to this.  Perhaps, Winfield was there.  Could it be, that similar to Rumsfeld’s Tom White, General Winfield had Captain Leidig for a fall guy?  This way, if the public or media found anything profoundly incriminating, they could blame it on the inexperience and incompetence of Capt. Leidig (Sure beats getting blamed for treason).  However, the media only threw softballs, while the 9/11 cover-up Commission would serve to protect them.

National Military Command Center (Photo: fas.org).

Chaos in the National Military Command Center

Captain Charles Leidig is in command of the NMCC, the “the military’s worldwide nerve center.” ^{NOTEREF _Ref133738785 \h  \* MERGEFORMAT 122} Telephone links are established with the NMCC located inside the Pentagon (on the opposite side of the building from where the attack happens) and federal emergency-response agencies.  An Air Threat Conference Call is initiated and it lasts for eight hours.  At one time or another, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, key military officers, leaders of the FAA and NORAD, the White House, and Air Force One are heard on the open line.[iii] ⁹⁷ NORAD command director Captain Michael Jellinek claims this happens “immediately” after the second WTC hit.¹²³ Also, Richard Clarke asserts the principles videoconference was setup at this time.⁶⁰ However, the 9/11 Commission concluded it started nearly 30 minutes later, at approximately 9:29 a.m.⁹⁷   Brigadier General Montague Winfield, who later takes over for Leidig, says, “All of the governmental agencies that were involved in any activity going on in the United States at that point, were in that conference.”[iv]  The call continues right through the Pentagon explosion; the impact is not felt within the NMCC.¹²²

Leidig mentions reports of a crash into the opposite side of the Pentagon, and requests that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld be added to the conference.⁹⁷   However, despite being in the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld doesn’t enter the NMCC or participate in the call until 10:30 a.m.

8:50 a.m.  From a New York Times report, “… military officials in [the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC)] [are] urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do.”[v]

Why were promotions given to incompetent Pentagon officials instead of demotions?  Captain Charles J. Leidig, Jr. promoted to Admiral!

According to Official Press Release from USNA Public Affairs Office:

Navy Capt. Charles J. Leidig, Jr.,’78, USN, has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral (lower half).  Leidig is currently serving as commandant, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.  Rear Admiral Leidig served as the 80th Commandant from Sept. 2003 — June 2005 and previously served briefly as the Deputy Commandant from June — Sept. 2003.  A Baltimore native and career submarine officer, he also served as Executive Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon prior to being assigned to the Naval Academy.  He was transferred from the Naval Academy for his next job as Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Marianas in Guam.[vi] 

Not one employee at the FAA, Defense, WMCC, NORAD or any other culpable civilian or military branch of government has been reprimanded or dismissed for incompetence.  The official fable is that indecisive employees, both civilian and military, stood around and dithered, wondering what to do, thereby creating an unprecedented systemic failure.

Excerpts of transcripts from the  9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing.

The following is a portion of the transcript that includes some of Leidig’s comments:

Admiral Leidig: …After the second aircraft impacted the second tower, the [National Military] Command Center then became a focal point for coordinating information flow.  And at that point I convened — by the procedures that existed on 9/11; I convened a conference called a Significant Event Conference....  FAA tried to be included in that conference and we had difficulty throughout the morning getting them in the conference. 
Mr. Lehman: Why didn’t somebody just pick up their cell phone and call them?...
Adm. Leidig: Yes, sir, we did open a separate line to them.  But the conference is on a special phone circuit and it’s classified to be able to pass information, relay information between very senior leadership all the way over to the White House.  And in some cases the president can be included in these conferences…[vii]

Communication problems and red tape issues are the proposed way out for Leidig and the cover-up Commission.  They are working together, to avoid implicating the President for his certain inaction that day.  Also, by blaming the communications with the FAA, they believe that they can put to rest that the Pentagon was ineffectual.
 

Mr. Lehman: But how long was FAA out of connectivity to this conferencing?
Adm. Leidig: Sir, I couldn’t tell you.  I don’t know how long.  I know that they were intermittently in.  Most of the time they were not in the conference. 
Mr. Lehman: They were not in.  And do you think that interfered with NORAD learning about 93, which was a pretty critical failure of the day?¹²⁷

The whole phony notion that NORAD needed FAA to warn them is the entire argument used by the Pentagon.  “NORAD uses a network of ground-based radars, sensors and fighter jets to detect, intercept and, if necessary, engage any threats to the continent.”[viii]  Transponders help to filter out all identifiable aircraft for NORAD and allow them to focus on those craft that are unidentified.  An aircraft flying without a transponder gets special attention.
 

Adm. Leidig: I can’t speak to that specific flight, sir, but I can say that it did hamper information flow because we were getting information in a more roundabout way from FAA...
Mr. Lehman: Do you think, the insistence on having a secure line as opposed to an open line, which is what FAA’s excuse is, was the main problem?   And, if so, why was it necessary?
Adm. Leidig: I know some changes have been made in the Command Center.  I apologize; I’ve been gone from the Joint Staff for over a year now and I’m not familiar with the upgrades.  I understand on that day that there were some compatibility issues between their secure phone and ours in the Command Center that caused them to drop out of the conference.  But I’m not aware of the technical aspects of it...
Mr. Lehman: Captain, were you satisfied with the connectivity you had with the White House, with the vice president, and through him to the president, or directly, say, to Air Force One?
Adm. Leidig: Sir, we were connected to the White House and I was satisfied with the communications to the White House...
Adm. Leidig: Sir, the most significant lesson — and I think you’ve kind of zeroed in on it — was the communications capabilities and the ability to bring leadership at the important organizations together to make a decision in a timely manner.  We were hampered that day by communications.  And any improvements in that area would be significant.¹²⁷ [Emphasis added]

Here Leidig again attempts to blame the inadequate response on communications systems; it’s an easy way out.  Notice now the commission starts to dig into the communications issue, so they can throw the blame on the equipment before closing the issue.  Pure cover-up technique used to avoid bringing up the President’s noninvolvement.  Keep in mind that NORAD, which is part of the NMCC system can see everything that the FAA can. 
 

Mr. Lehman: Yeah, I think also we all know that there are always communications glitches, and there have got to be work-arounds.  I mean, the fact was that FAA Headquarters did know about 93 very early on, from 9:34 on.  And if somebody had just picked up the phone to keep the connectivity open, it could have made a difference...
Adm. Leidig: Sir, I can’t speak to the connectivity with Air Force One.  I was connected to the White House.  And my understanding is Air Force One was in contact with the White House Situation Room.  I was not in contact with…¹²⁷ [Emphasis added]

Mr. Roemer, as part of the cover-up Commission has the job of protecting his masters.  Here he notices that Leidig is about to put his foot in his mouth and quickly cuts him off.  …a little steering might help.
 

Mr. Roemer: So you have no knowledge of that. 
Adm. Leidig: No, sir.¹²⁷ [Emphasis added]
 

Now he’s back on track, “I don’t know or don’t remember” those are the correct responses.

Mr. Lehman: Is there no NMCC protocol to connect directly with Air Force One? 
Adm. Leidig: Yes, sir, there is a capability to do that.  On that day we were connected with the White House. 
Mr. Roemer: Why weren’t you using that other capability? 
Adm. Leidig: I don’t recall, sir…¹²⁷ [Emphasis added]

“I don’t recall”, was what the Commission wanted to put on the record — that would exonerate Bush to a large extent.  In the least it would prevent the “can of worms” from being opened.  He is not telling the truth, and is obviously protecting the President, with some help from the commission.  He does acknowledge that they did have the capability to communicate with Air Force One.  If there is anyone thing that he would have remembered, it would have been a conversation with the President of the United States!  Not only does he not remember what he may have said, but whether he even had the conversation to begin with.  Compare this to how he remembers details of conversation that he had with others of far less status than the President.

Both NORAD and NMCC knew of the hijackings even before the first aircraft hit the WTC.  The FAA was on a phone bridge with them, and they were in contact with the President.  Of course, if Leidig had told the truth, then the entire world would know that both Bush and Cheney, deliberately did nothing and permitted all three attacks!

Captain Leidig’s incredible similarities with Pearl Harbor’s Lt. Kermit Tyler. 

In 1945, the Navy Court of Inquiry investigated the suspicious complacency in the Pearl Harbor Attack.  One target of the investigation was Lt. Kermit Tyler who was assigned as pursuit officer.  Tyler was assigned to the information center at the office for Pearl Harbor’s air defenses; his job was instrumental in that he was responsible to order U.S. planes to intercept supposed enemy planes.[ix]  Some of Lt. Kermit Tyler’s outlandish responses at the Navy board of inquiry were:

…the radar operator reported that he had a larger plot than he had previously seen; that is about all there was to it. ^{NOTEREF _Ref132601102 \h  \* MERGEFORMAT 129}

Tyler told the radar operators “Don’t worry about it.”¹²⁹ Lt. Tyler actually instructed Opana radar station to shut down...[!!!]  Privates Elliott and Lockhard however continued to plot the incoming [Japanese] flight...

I didn’t do anything.  I was just waiting for my tour to be finished. …  My duties, I believe, were chiefly for training, inasmuch as it was the first morning I had ever been there on such duty when the information center was even manned in any degree at all.  I had no specified duties, either written or oral just to report there for duty.¹²⁹

Besides conspiring in treason, both went in front of “boards of inquiry” and shielded their masters.

Treasonous Lt. Tyler, from ‘42 to ‘45, was promoted to Lt. Colonel!

Captain Leidig, after 9/11, was promoted to Rear Admiral!

Just before 9:00 a.m., Bush was on a secure phone line to Condoleeza Rice