Langley F-16s Sent “Out over Ocean”

“Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we.  They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country and our people, and neither do we.”

                                                                 — George W. Bush, allegedly misspeaking, 5 August 2004

9:21 a.m. – two F-16s put on battle stations.

Major Dean Eckmann, an F-16 fight pilot at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, is told that a plane had hit the WTC.  He assumed at the time it was “some kind of accident.”[i]  A few minutes (try 40 minutes!) later he claims to be put on battle stations, which was at 9:21 a.m., Major Eckmann recalled, “The scramble horn goes off and we get the yellow light, which is our battle stations.  So at that point I go running out to the airplanes — to my assigned alert airplane — get suited up and I get into the cockpit ready to start.”[ii]  However, another pilot, codenamed Honey (apparently Craig Borgstrom), claims the battle stations command happens at 9:24 a.m.; while the 9/11 cover-up Commission claims it happens at 9:09 a.m.  Both of the pilots, who performed the mission, disagree with the 9/11 Commission Report time.  This is further proof that the Bush biased and edited report was fudged, to minimize the scale of the ineptness/ complacency in the response the attacks.

9:23 a.m. – NEADS Battle Commander Orders Fighters to chase down Phantom Flight 11. 

This is a disturbing request since even the FAA and American Airlines knew Flight 11 had been hijacked and then crashed into the WTC 40 minutes earlier.  Some of the most damaging orders for diverting the nations fighter’s resources came from NEADS.  They commanded the F-16s as indicated:

Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. [Flight 11]  Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington.  Okay?  I think we need to scramble Langley right now.  And I’m gonna take the fighters from Otis [AFB]; try to chase this guy down if I can find him. ^{NOTEREF _Ref129831029 \h  \* MERGEFORMAT 97}

It appears NEADS is rather helpful in thwarting the F-16 responses.

9:24 a.m. – The Langley, Virginia, base gets the scramble order.

Captain Craig Borgstrom (Honey), as mentioned, claimed that at this time the battle stations alert sounded and two pilots are given the order to climb into their F-16s and await further instructions. ^{NOTEREF _Ref129831029 \h  \* MERGEFORMAT 97} Then, Honey, the supervising pilot, talks to these two pilots.  About “five or ten minutes later” a person from NORAD calls and Honey speaks to him at the nearby administrative office.  He is told that all three of them are ordered to scramble.  Honey [Captain Craig Borgstrom] goes to his living quarters, grabs his flight gear, puts it on, runs to his plane, and takes off[iii] (thus, takeoff time is about 9:30 a.m.).  Why wouldn’t they have a discussion after they are airborne, instead of wasting precious minutes?  If they were on “battle stations” why wouldn’t Honey have been already suited up and ready to go?  As they previously had just defined “battle stations” to be.

Later NEADS and NORAD, deceptively claim that the Langley scramble was in response to Flight 77.

In their testimony, and in other public statements, NORAD officials stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77 and/or United 93.[iv]  These statements were incorrect.  The report of American 11 heading south as the cause of the Langley scramble is reflected not just in taped conversations at NEADS, on chat logs compiled at NEADS, and NORAD.  Yet this response to a phantom aircraft, American 11, is not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by FAA or DoD.  Instead, since 9/11, the scramble of the Langley fighters has been described as a response to the reported hijacking of American 77, or United 93, or some combination of the two.  This inaccurate account created the appearance that the Langley scramble at 9:30 a.m. was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft.  The Langley fighters fly east and over the ocean, instead of north to Washington D.C.

Why did Langley AFB elect to send fighters out over the Atlantic Ocean, and not to protect the Washington D.C. area from potential “threats”?

According to the 9/11 Cover-up Commission Report and commander-level testimonies the above question yielded very interesting answers.  Some of their responses were:

• Varying accounts that the fighters are ordered to Washington, New York, Baltimore, or no destination at all.
• The pilots don’t understand there is an emergency and head east.
• Unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target, or the target’s location.
• A generic flight plan incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles.  The purpose of the generic flight plan was to quickly get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace.
• The lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go “090 for 60” was newer guidance that superseded the original scramble order.
• Once they got in the air, the Langley fighters observed peacetime noise restrictions requiring that they fly more slowly than supersonic speed and takeoff over water, pointed away from Washington.
• NORAD Commander Major General Larry Arnold explains that the fighters head over the ocean because NORAD is looking outward and has to have clearance to fly over land.

Langley pilot claims they were ordered to that location!

The pilots, as one would expect, were “just following orders” Thus, explaining why the generals and commanders are trying to cover their butts for their treasonous behavior — also, as one would expect!  Langley pilot, Craig Borgstrom, said after taking off:

They (NEADS) [are] giving us the heading and altitude of north-northeast up to 20,000 feet.  Then shortly after takeoff they changed our heading more northwesterly and gave us max subsonic [about 45% speed!].  That’s as fast as you can go without breaking the sound barrier.[v]

Why in the middle of a national emergency is someone concerned about noise levels!  Later, the Langley fighters were vectored toward Washington, instead of New York.

Path of Langley F-16s

Because of the diversion, the F-16s don’t reach Washington until roughly 10:00 a.m.

Accounts differ as to how far from Washington the F-16 fighters scrambled from Langley are when the Pentagon is attacked.  The Langley, Virginia, base is 129 miles from Washington.  NORAD originally claimed that, at the time of the crash, the fighters are 105 miles away, despite having taken off seven minutes earlier.[vi]

At 9:36 a.m., NEADS discovers that Flight 77 [presumed] is only a few miles from the White House and is dismayed to find the fighters have headed east over the ocean. [This is where NEADS sent them!]  They are ordered to Washington immediately, but are still about 150 miles away.⁹⁷   This is farther away than when they had originally took off from!

After the Pentagon had been hit, they come back from their trek over the Atlantic.

The F-16 pilot Captain Craig Borgstrom codenamed Honey offers a different explanation.  He says they are flying toward New York, when they see a black column of smoke coming from Washington, about 30 or 40 miles to the west.  He is then asked over the radio by NEADS if he can confirm the Pentagon is burning.  He confirms it.  The F-16s are then ordered to set up a defensive perimeter above Washington.[vii] [viii]

10:10 a.m. – Langley fighters told they couldn’t shoot down hijacked planes.

According to the 9/11 Commission, the NEADS Mission Crew Commander is sorting out the orders given to the Langley fighter pilots.  [Unbelievably]  The Commander does not know that Flight 93 had been heading toward Washington or that it had crashed.  He explicitly instructs the Langley fighters that they cannot shoot down aircraft — they have “negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over Washington. 

Even after 10:31 a.m. NEADS does not pass along NORAD shoot down order.

Authorization to shoot down hijacked civilian aircraft only reaches NEADS at 10:31 a.m.  Even then, the authorization is not passed on to the pilots.⁹⁷  NORAD Commander Major General Larry Arnold instructs his staff to broadcast the following message over a NORAD chat log: “10:31 Vice President [Cheney] has cleared us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC [General Arnold].”  NEADS first learns of the “shoot down order” from this message.  However, NEADS does not pass the order to the fighter pilots in New York City and Washington.  NEADS leaders later say they do not pass it on because they are unsure how the pilots should proceed with this guidance!⁹⁷

It should be obvious to anyone that there was a clear pattern of obstruction out of NEADS — they took an active role in subverting America’s defenses in a time of a military crisis.

Medals for heroism were passed out like candy — in the aftermath of 9/11.

It seems that, those who had received the most accommodations and promotions, were also those that participated in the hindrance of our nation defenses.  Was 9/11 considered a success for our leaders?  Their appearance seems to suggest this.  Governor Pataki, while passing medals out, said.  “On behalf of all New Yorkers, I am honored to recognize their exemplary service with these Conspicuous Service Medals...

Col. Robert K. Marr, of Rome, Commander, Northeast Air Defense Sector…”[!!!][ix]

General Timeline of Langley’s Response

8:45 a.m. – 1st WTC crash.

9:03 a.m. – 2nd WTC crash.

9:21 a.m. – Scramble order given.

9:30 a.m. – F-16 patrol takes off from Langley for the Atlantic Ocean!

9:38 a.m. – Pentagon is on fire.

10:00 a.m. – F-16 patrol arrives at Pentagon.

The pilots flying over New York City and Washington claim they are never given a formal “shoot down order” that day.