The new Rumsfeld DoD hijacking Directive

“Never would have crossed anyone’s mind that a commercial airline — usually a hijacker who takes an airplane, of course, wants to get someplace or wants to make a statement or wants to go on television or wants to hold hostages, but this is a distinctly different behavior pattern than we’ve seen previously, and now, obviously, it’s something we have to be attentive to.”

                                         — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

The set of procedures for responding to hijackings were changed.

The 1997 procedures provided a clear way for the military to respond to an emergency such as a hijacking.  But, Rumsfeld went ahead and changed directive in June 2001!  He muddied the waters when he introduced the CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A.  The objective of the June 1st, 2001 directive was to place the decision making power — in the specific case of a hijacking — into the hands of the Secretary of Defense.  This is repeated in multiple paragraphs:

c. Military Escort Aircraft

(1) When notified that military escort aircraft are needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or USELEMNORAD to determine if suitable aircraft are available and forward the request to the Secretary of Defense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7 (reference d).[i] [Empasis added.  See Appendix for the complete CJCSI 3610.01A.]

Any response to a suspected hijack would require the pre-approval of the Secretary of Defense.

This creates the necessity for: making a request to the Secretary of Defense, and receiving approval before military aircraft may respond.  

The statement “to determine if suitable aircraft are available” is also suspicious.  Can anyone imagine a situation where the United States of America does not have “suitable aircraft” available to respond to a hijacked airliner?  NORAD tried to spin such a story in the aftermath of September 11th.  Supposedly, we just didn’t have any fighter planes on the morning of September 11th.  What were they all doing?

Previous directives were issued in 1997, 1986 and before, there were standing orders to the military as to how to respond to hijackings over United States. Here is another paragraph from Rumsfeld’s treasonous document:

AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND DESTRUCTION OF DERELICT AIRBORNE OBJECTS

b. Support.

When notified that military assistance is needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will:

(1) Determine whether or not the assistance needed is reasonably available from police or commercial sources.  If not, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or NORAD to determine if suitable assets are available and will forward the request to the Secretary of Defense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7 (reference d).¹⁰⁶ (See Appendix for the complete CJCSI 3610.01A)

The usage of the word approval is the major change here to the existing hijacking response procedures.  While the text of the document tries to link this “approval” to the previous orders “DODD 3025.15,” the approval is now required before providing any assistance at all.  Previously, approval only would be required-to respond with lethal force.

Where was the Secretary of Defense’s approval on September 11th 2001? 

This June 1^st update to the existing DoD order stopped all military assistance dead in its tracks until approval from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld could be granted, which, by his own admission — was not.  Furthermore, there is no mention of the Secretary of Defense approving anything related to the hijackings.  He was essentially derelict of duty, and later, he falsely claimed he was in total ignorance of the inbound aircraft that attacked the Pentagon.

In this manner, fighter planes were held up from immediately responding to the hijacked commercial jets on September the 11th.  The base Flight Commanders were ordered by the June 1st “Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction” to wait for “approval” from the Secretary of Defense before they could respond to hijackings, where they would have routinely responded in the past.

Jamie Gorelick of the 9/11 Commission has Rumsfeld and Meyers dancing in their chairs.

CIA adviser Jamie Gorelick’s throws a question at Rumsfeld; she recalled being in a room with Wolfowitz:

I had a conversation with Secretary Wolfowitz’s — one of his predecessors, when the 1996 Olympics were being planned about what do we do when an aircraft is being hijacked and is flying into a stadium at the Olympics.¹⁰⁰  

She found it incomprehensible that the possibility of this happening at the Pentagon had never occurred to either Wolfowitz or Rumsfeld.  However, Gorelick failed to mention any of the war games that simulated a hijacking or the infamous October 24, 2000 drill at the Pentagon.

She went on to ask specific questions about when an order to authorize fighter pilots to shoot down aircraft was issued on the morning of September 11.  Rumsfeld complicated, confused, and shifted the focus of the responses:

 Gorelick: Was it your understanding that the NORAD pilots who were circling over Washington D.C. that morning had indeed received a shoot down order?
Rumsfeld: When I arrived in the command center, one of the first things I heard, and I was with you, was that the order had been given and that the pilots — correction, not the pilots necessarily, but the command had been given the instructions that their pilots could, in fact, use their weapons to shoot down commercial airliners filled with our people in the event that the aircraft appeared to be behaving in a threatening way and an unresponsive way.
Gorelick: Now, you make a distinction there between the command and the pilots.  Was it your understanding that the pilots had received that order?
Rumsfeld: I’m trying to get in time because...
Myers: Well, I think — my understanding, I’ve talked to General Eberhart, commander now [sic] of NORAD, and I think he’s briefed the staff.  And I think what he told the staff, what he told me, as I recall, was that the pilots did — at the appropriate point when the authority to engage civilian airliners was given, that the pilots knew that fairly quickly.  I mean, it went down through the chain of command...
Rumsfeld: ...The reason I am hesitant is because we went through two or three iterations of the rules of engagement.  And in the end, we ended up delegating that authority to, at the lowest level, I believe, to two stars.
Myers: Right.
Rumsfeld: And the pilot would then describe the situation to that level.  To the extent that level had time, they would come up to General Eberhart.  To the extent Eberhart had time, he would come up to me.  And to the extent I had time, I might talk to the president, which in fact, I did do on several occasions during the remainder of the day with respect to international flights heading to this country that were squawking “hijack.”
Gorelick: I’m just trying to understand whether it is your understanding that the NORAD pilots themselves, who were circling over Washington, as you referred to in your statement, whether they knew that they had authority to shoot down a plane (...)
Rumsfeld: I do not know what they thought.  In fact, I haven’t talked to any of the pilots that were up there.  I certainly was immediately concerned that we did know what they thought they could do.¹⁰⁰

 If Rumsfeld was immediately concerned, why wouldn’t he had simply clarified the issue at that time?  Whether or not a pilot has a shoot down order directly communicated to him, is of the highest significance, especially given the fact that the pilot may not have known if he was still in one of the war games scheduled for that day.  Officials at NORAD have said that when the hijackings first occurred, they initially thought it was part of the Vigilant Guardian drills running that morning.  Despite some confusion, once Flight 11 struck the World Trade Center at 8:45 a.m., everyone should have had known — it was not an exercise anymore.

Rumsfeld, in front of the Commission trying to explain

where he was all-day — on 9/11 (Images source — dod.mil).

Smoking gun remarks of an officer at NORAD — dispute official story.

Marine Corps Maj. Mike Snyder of NORAD told a Boston Globe reporter that, “The command had been told about the hijacking 10 minutes before the first plane hit the first World Trade Center tower.  Snyder said the fighters remained on the ground until after the Pentagon was hit, even though “fighters routinely intercept aircraft.”[ii] That statement also agrees with testimony of Capt. Mike Jellinek and Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins, both who worked as commanders at NORAD that day.  Powers from above had kept the aircraft grounded.

If Bush and Cheney discussed “shoot down” orders, why didn’t the pilots know about them?

At 9:55 a.m., after all three attacks were completed.  Bush spoke to Cheney, who said the combat air patrol needed rules of engagement.  Cheney recommended that Bush authorize the military shoot down authorization.  “I said, ‘You bet,’” Bush recalled.  “We had a little discussion, but not much.”  Bush then talked to Rumsfeld to clarify the procedures.

First, pilots would seek to make radio contact with the other plane and tell the pilot to land at a specific location.  If that failed, the pilots were to use visual signals.  These included having the fighters fly in front of the other plane. … If the plane continued heading toward what was seen as a significant target with apparently hostile intent, the U.S. pilot would have the authority to shoot it down.[iii]

With Bush’s approval, Rumsfeld passed the order down the chain of command.¹⁰⁸  

Was that the conversation or just the usual spin?  Were NEADS and other agencies covering for Bush and Cheney?  Is there any real evidence to collaborate their story?  Frankly there is so much conflicting statements regarding the shoot down issue.  But could all this confusion have also played a deceptive role in assigning guilt on whom it properly belonged?

If these rules were placed into effect then why didn’t anyone know about them?  Is this account by Bush, really true?  If so, then why did they wait all day to discuss this most important topic?  Commanders and pilots were confused because no one told them what to do, or not to do.  Keep in mind that this confusion only occurred because Rumsfeld had changed the well-established guidelines for dealing with hijacked aircraft.

Who is Enron’s Tom White?  And what was his role in 9/11?

At Donald Rumsfeld’s first public statement on September 11th, 2001, he brought up the issue of Tom White’s responsibility…  At the Pentagon, September 11, 2001 6:42 p.m. Rumsfeld said:

Secretary of the Army Tom White, who has a responsibility for incidents like this as executive agent for the Department of Defense, is also joining me.[iv] [Emphasis added]

This is clearly an attempt to divert blame and responsibility away from the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and over to his executive agent in an effort to confuse the issue.  Tom White, former Enron executive, was appointed as Secretary of the Army on 31 May 2001.  One day before the new hijacking directive was issued!  If inquisitive reporters started asking too much questions about the procedures and failures — there was a readied patsy.  Rumsfeld had Tom White.  However, no mainstream reporters bothered to investigate these matters at this level, and so the patsy wound up being unnecessary.

The full responsibility, for this complete failure of the NORAD system, ultimately leads to Rumsfeld.

It is important to point out, that Rumsfeld was not just “derelict in duty” on 9/11.  That was what they wanted you to believe — it was much worse than that.  He pretty much acknowledges that he didn’t do anything, and pleaded ignorance.  The 9/11 Commission should have held Rumsfeld accountable, but other than a few embarrassing moments in front of the Commission, he got away with murder — literally.  To begin with, he would have been instrumental in designing the war games, the creation of the disabling DoD directive, the diversionary training, the shuffling in of patsies, and the massive cover-up operation.  Worst still, there is the issue of an even more active role — one of a most sinister nature.  Did he completely sell himself out to the military-industrial complex?  Was the 9/11 operation going to be the new Pearl Harbor, one that his PNAC cohorts had been touting as necessary to “complete the transformation?”

The buck stops here… No matter what… The complacency of the 9/11 response ends with the President and the Secretary of Defense.

As per Directive No 3025.15:

“The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism may be requested only by the President (or in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives) and must be authorized by the President.  All requests for assistance in responding to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must also be approved by the Secretary of Defense...  The Secretary of Defense shall manage the DoD’s response to any acts or threats of terrorism...”¹⁰²
 

The above is somewhat misleading however, Again it was worst than that…  What the 9/11 Commission didn’t mention, because they don’t want you to know, is that Rumsfeld changed that directive just prior to the attacks of 9/11.  When he introducing the CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A, he had disabled Directive No 3025.15. 

Why wasn’t this damming evidence ever brought out in the 9/11 Commission Report?